

Industry fights back against campaign for 'unisex' insurance rates

By Clara Germani
Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor

• A male driver under age 25 falls into a statistical high-risk category, so he pays more for insurance coverage than a young woman of the same age.

• A man and a woman who work in similar jobs, at the same salaries for an equal amount of time, accumulate the same amount of money in their pension funds. But on retirement the woman collects smaller benefit payments each month than the similarly situated man because statistics show that women are expected to live longer and thus collect pension payments longer.

Sex discrimination in the insurance business has put consumer and civil rights concerns at odds. Such situations should be evened out in the interest of civil rights, many feminists say. The insurance industry says that the very basis of the business is to calculate risk based on the differences between groups — a policy that helps hold rates down.

No one likes to be reduced to a statistic or a stereotype. But there may be some benefits, as well as drawbacks, to consumers in being pigeonholed and categorized.

Trade association officials say the insurance industry is facing one of the biggest challenges ever to its actuarial foundations with this effort to superimpose social policy on business decisions. Further, they say, across-the-board unisex rate-setting would constitute a major overhaul of the industry that could cost consumers millions of dollars in higher insurance costs.

The movement to mandate unisex rate setting in auto, health, disability, life, and pension and annuity plans has gained some convincing victories. Montana, no bastion of feminist ideology, this spring became the first state to bar sex discrimination in rate setting. Hawaii, Massachusetts, Michigan, and North

Carolina already prohibit gender from being used to set auto insurance rates. Broader applications proposed this year, like those in Montana that go into effect in 1985, have been beaten back by the industry in these states and half a dozen others. And later this month the Supreme Court is expected to rule on an appeal of a case in which an Arizona state employee successfully challenged a pension plan option that would have paid her less than a male counterpart.

Federal unisex rate-setting bills in Congress have enough momentum that one major life insurance trade group's leadership threw its support behind the legislation in hope of gaining concessions. But a precedent-setting membership uprising reined the group back

drinking habits; weight; driving practices; life style," says Judy Goldsmith, national president of NOW. "It should not penalize people for something over which they have no control. Although there are measurable actuarial differences on the basis of race and religion, the industry does not discriminate in those areas. . . . Sex should be treated in exactly the same way."

The actuarial data provide both sides with plenty of ammunition. Apparently using the same statistics, two interpretations emerge: NOW says the average woman spends in her lifetime about \$16,000 more than the average man for auto, life, disability, pensions, and annuities; insurance groups say the average woman pays \$8,000 less.

sidize the costs normally charged to high risks, the group suggests.

The industry's most heated objections are over the impact of retroactive implementation on retirement plans. The federal bills require insurers to equalize pension and annuity contracts at the highest benefit level of each class — not just for those still paying into programs, but on existing plans that are already paying out to retirees.

"By doing this you have to provide insurance you didn't collect premiums to provide," says Stephen Kellison, executive director of the AAA. In public retirement systems, the extra costs could amount to billions of dollars that would have to come from state funds, he says, and insurance companies would have to make up for it in individual programs with higher rates in newer contracts.

Results of unisex auto insurance pricing in other states are mixed. But the industry points to an automatic increase in young women's rates. And, says George Bernstein, an attorney for several major insurers, if insurance companies can't charge the high risks more money, then market forces will cause insurers to avoid the high risks and accept only the lower risks.

In states like Massachusetts, there has been an increase in the number of uninsurable drivers with the passage of the unisex law. But, notes an Insurance Services Office official, unisex laws in that state were passed simultaneously with age and geographic distinctions that would affect the results, too.

NOW's Ms. Goldsmith concludes that sex-based actuarial data is used to justify profits.

But insurance companies are in business to make a profit, says Andrew Tobias, author of "The Invisible Bankers," a book critical of the insurance business. He says the business is competitive enough that if unisex pricing was workable, it would likely spur an upstart company to offer competitive unisex rates.

Estimated impact of unisex insurance rates on premiums (Percentage change)

Type of insurance	Male Age 20	Male Age 40	Male Age 65	Female Age 20	Female Age 40	Female Age 65
Life insurance	-2%	-3%	N/A	+6%	+11%	N/A
Health insurance:						
Medical expense	+56%	+13%	0	+14%	-6%	0
Disability	+24%	+2%	0	-6%	-21%	0
Auto insurance	-20%	0	0	+37%	0	0
Individual annuities	+6%	+6%	+6%	-6%	-6%	-6%

Source: American Academy of Actuaries

to hard-line opposition.

The National Organization of Women (NOW), which staged demonstrations over the issue in 25 cities last week, contends that the industry's statistics don't provide a fair basis for rate setting.

"Insurance can be and should be based on factors that can be modified: smoking and

The American Academy of Actuaries (AAA), a trade group for those who calculate insurance risks, concluded in a study on the economic impact of unisex ratings that women as a group would pay over \$1 billion more annually for all types of insurance than they do now and men would pay \$515 million less. Low-risk individuals would have to sub-

Why West Germans must call their little 'Rasputin' Hans

By Howard Reason
Special to The Christian Science Monitor

What's in a name? The question on which Shakespeare's Juliet soliloquized is a big nuisance for West German registrars.

For a growing number of West German parents are giving their children names which, when they grow up, could turn into millstones around their necks. It seems that many parents would rather call their babies a bizarre or original name, even if they have to invent it, than resort to the traditional Hans, Klaus, or Helmut, Anna, Dorothee or Marion.


Unlike France, which insists that children's names figure in the calendar of saints, West Germany allows parents to call their kids whatever they like, as long as the names "remain within the framework of public morals and order" — according to a verdict of the federal supreme court.

That ruling was sufficiently vague to leave much to the discretion of the town or village registrar, whose verdict can be challenged through a whole series of courts. Cases sometimes take years.

Among names recently accepted are Pepsi-Carola (for a girl) and Rasputin (for a boy).

Other parents have not been so fortunate. A Hamburg judge recently denied one couple the right to call their son "McDonald" (since it is a corporate name). Attempts to name children "Agfa" (a type of camera), and "Orno" (a soap powder), have also been rejected.

The latest test case comes from the state of Rhineland-Palatinate, where reg-



istrar Karl Seidel refused Manfred and Marion Hessler the right to call their baby boy "Pumuckl," the name of a popular cartoon dwarf on television.

"Where will it all end?" sighed Seidel. "Next we'll have parents wanting to call their child 'E.T.'"

The Hesslers do not agree. They feel their basic liberties have been violated by the decision and are prepared to take the case to the Federal Constitutional Court if necessary to obtain justice. The child is five months old and still does not have a name.

Several West German parents, apparently weary of the drab republicanism of their country, have tried and failed to give their children noble names with built-in titles. Among those recently turned down are "Princess Anne," "Baron," and "Lady Diana." But a Dortmund family won their case against a registrar who had refused to let them call their son "Merlin," after the wizard of English legend — a name to conjure with.

Whether that little boy will thank his parents when he grows up is open to question. Perhaps he will be consoled by Humpty Dumpty's answer to Alice in Lewis Carroll's "Through the Looking Glass." When Alice tells him: "With a name like yours, you could be any shape, almost," the wretched egg-shaped creature replies: "They gave it me — for an un-birthday present."

Anderson ponders an '84 campaign to test 'sound-alike' candidates

By Godfrey Sperling Jr.

Washington
John Anderson isn't talking about winning in a new run for the American presidency. Instead, he is focusing on perhaps heading a "New America Party."

This party, he told reporters over breakfast, could infuse the government with new ideas and would make its impact by signaling the new President that there was substantial dissent to the way he was leading the nation.

Basically, the Anderson thesis seems to be this: Both parties and their presidential can-



By Peter Main, staff photographer

Anderson: a party, not personality cult

didates in their bid to reach out to a wide spectrum of special interests end up sounding like tweedledee and tweedledee.


What the nation needs, Mr. Anderson said, "is a new party that could do something about this systemic failure by having the vision and courage to go ahead and talk about things that may not be popular with this group or that group or another group but is necessary, given the kind of problems we have in the nation and the world."

"How do you hope to appeal to Republicans?" a reporter asked.

"It will come over their disappointment over economic issues," Anderson said. "By voting for our third-party candidate they could signal to the Republican Party that even if we don't win, there are a . . . number of us who are terribly worried that the GOP has deserted its principles and, as a result, the economy is going to be in serious trouble."

But didn't the excitement for you last time come mainly from Democrats — as in Massachusetts?

I would hope that the excitement this time



would be over the new party — to permanently restructure the process, not a personality cult. And over the ideas that would be in the platform.

What is your position on US involvement in Central America?

I don't happen to believe we will solve the problems of Central America militarily — and I also believe the main focus of our concern ought to be Mexico.

Are you for a nuclear freeze, the way Senator [Alan] Cranston is?

Oh, yes. I feel very strongly that if we continue to build and develop and qualitatively improve systems, we will be shooting at a moving target we will never hit as far as effective arms control is concerned.

Thus, the candidate many voters found the most refreshing voice on the political scene in 1980 is at it again. And he's gearing up a campaign that could be bad news for the Democrats and good news for Ronald Reagan.

HUMAN EVENTS
2 July 1983

ARTICLE APPEARED

ON PAGE 10

KGB Expert Bares Soviet Active Measures

John Barron, a former U.S. naval intelligence officer, is a well-known investigative journalist who has received many awards. He is currently senior editor of Reader's Digest based in Washington, D.C. and is the author of several books, the most famous probably being KGB: The Secret Work of Soviet Secret Agents. Mr. Barron was recently interviewed by Cliff Kincaid, an associate editor of HUMAN EVENTS, about his latest book, KGB Today: The Hidden Hand (Reader's Digest Press, \$19.95).

Q. Mr. Barron, several chapters of your book are based on interviews with Stanislav Levchenko, the KGB major stationed in Japan who defected to the U.S. in 1979. What were his major revelations and what effect have they had?

A. He revealed the identities of many of the KGB agents who helped comprise the Tokyo network of the KGB. These included key leaders of the Japanese Socialist Party and the prominent governing Liberal Democratic party. He identified as KGB agents the editor-in-chief of the largest conservative newspaper in Japan, important journalists on other leading newspapers, as well as the Kyodo news service.

Beyond that, Levchenko laid bare the whole *modus operandi* of the KGB in a major industrialized democracy. We know from his intimate and authoritative knowledge that all he exposed in Japan, the KGB is attempting to do in Washington and in every other capital.

But I would say that despite the devastation wrought upon KGB operations in Japan, the major import of Stanislav Levchenko's disclosures is the insight it has afforded us into the Soviet concept and practice of what the KGB calls "active measures." That is a wide range of actions extending from the overt to the deeply clandestine, orchestrated to affect the policies, opinions and destinies of other nations. We've never had anyone who had been at the core of these operations, who could detail them from the inside. I think that these intimate disclosures, explanations and analyses that Levchenko has provided have already affected the policies and some of the decisions of the U.S. government and the West as a whole.

Q. Can you talk about that?

A. I think that his analysis of how important the staging of the Olympics in the Soviet Union was to the Soviet oligarchy probably was a factor contributing to President Carter's decision to boycott the Olympics.

Levchenko explained that the Soviets had no hope of impressing the world with the delights of Soviet society. They had no illusions that the foreigners

flocking into Moscow would be thrilled by what they saw. But the oligarchy craves legitimacy. It is acutely aware that it rules only by force, not by any popular mandate.

By showing the Soviet people that the rest of the world was willing to come to Moscow to stage these games, which are symbolic of civilization, the oligarchy could communicate to the people, "See, we are legitimate, we are recognized, we are an accepted member of the world family." Levchenko's thesis was that if you withhold participation, your sanction, you will deprive them of what they want to achieve.

CONTINUED

ATLANTIC
July 1983ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 10MILITARY SPENDING
**ARE WE
FALLING BEHIND
THE SOVIETS?***Franklyn D. Holzman**The case for greater U.S. defense
spending may rest on a misreading
of the military balance between NATO
and the Warsaw Pact nations*

MANY THOUGHTFUL OBSERVERS in America believe that the military might of the Warsaw Pact nations, especially the USSR, has been increasing relative to that of the NATO nations, especially the United States, and that, as a result, the Warsaw Pact nations have achieved military parity with NATO, or have pushed ahead. This military buildup, moreover, is taken as prima facie evidence that the Warsaw Pact nations have aggressive intentions vis-à-vis their neighbors.

What explains such a momentous shift of positions in the arms race? The usual answer is that the Soviet Union has increased military spending to a greater degree than the United States has. To reverse this dangerous trend, naturally, the U.S. and its allies have been contemplating similar increases. As President Reagan put it in his State of the Union message on February 18, 1981:

I believe my duty as President requires that I recommend increases in defense spending over the coming years. Since 1970, the Soviet Union has invested \$300 billion more in its military forces than we have.

In the two and a half years since that address, the President's apprehensions about Soviet aggressiveness have been reflected in the sharp rise in U.S. mili-

Franklyn D. Holzman is professor of economics at Tufts University and a research fellow at Harvard University's Russian Research Center. He is the author of Financial Checks on Soviet Defense Expenditures.

tary expenditures, our steadfast opposition to the Soviet-Western European gas pipeline, and a steady deterioration of relations in practically every other area in which the two nations interact.

But there is considerable evidence that U.S. estimates of Soviet and Warsaw Pact military expenditures are calculated incorrectly and are presented in a misleading way. With proper calculation and interpretation, the military-spending gaps that favor the Soviet bloc largely disappear. This leads one to question the magnitude of the Soviet bloc's military buildup and to view skeptically the claims of the Administration that the buildup is necessarily offensive rather than defensive.

Several factors help to explain what may be a distorted view of Soviet-bloc military expenditures. Perhaps most important is the tendency of bureaucrats, politicians, and the press to summarize complicated computations with a few simple figures. Two such figures are the CIA annual estimates, widely quoted, that the USSR is currently outspending the U.S. on defense by 50 percent, and that over the decade 1971-1980 the USSR outspent us by \$420 billion (an update of President Reagan's \$300 billion).

Once these figures surface, they begin to have a life of their own; rarely mentioned are the numerous qualifications attached to them by the CIA when they were first released. While the two figures presented may have validity for some purposes, even without qualifications, for other purposes they are misleading and inappropriate. For example, the CIA's 50 percent figure is based on an estimate of Soviet military spending that, when converted into rubles and expressed as a percentage of Soviet GNP, reveals the so-called burden of defense spending, providing an indication of the military drain on Soviet resources. Currently, the CIA estimates that burden at between 12 and 14 percent of GNP. Conceptually speaking, this is a valid use of the CIA's estimate.

Suppose, however, we want a figure that represents the confrontation between the United States and the USSR. President Reagan clearly used the related \$300 billion figure in this way in his State of the Union address. For that pur-

pose, the 50 percent and \$420 billion gap figures are inappropriate, because a large part of Soviet military spending is irrelevant to the superpower confrontation. For example, the Soviet Union maintains an army of roughly 750,000 men on the long Sino-Soviet border. According to Harold Brown, former secretary of defense, in his 1979 annual report, the Soviets "have felt obliged to allocate up to about 20 percent of their total defense effort to the Far East and the PRC [People's Republic of China]." In various statements in the past few years, the CIA has estimated the same figure at between 12.5 and 20 percent.

Money spent by the Soviet Union to support its large army across 5,000 miles of inhospitable terrain has thus not been available to build tanks, planes, and missiles that might be used against the U.S. and its NATO allies. If 15 percent of Soviet expenditures is subtracted from the total (the CIA estimate is \$1,535 billion for the years 1971 to 1980), the current gap is reduced from 50 percent to 27.5 percent and the 1971-1980 expenditure gap is reduced by \$230 billion—that is, from \$420 billion to \$190 billion (all in 1979 dollars).

Thus, both the current and the ten-year spending gaps are roughly halved by removing expenditures directed at China. The appropriateness of removing these expenditures is supported by the Department of Defense's practice of excluding U.S. expenditures on Vietnam when comparing NATO and Warsaw Pact total defense costs.

Finding a true estimate of the gap between Warsaw Pact and NATO "confrontation" spending requires another major adjustment. The CIA restricts its published estimates to comparisons of military spending by the U.S. and the USSR. This establishes a framework for virtually all governmental and media discussions of military spending. In effect, these discussions imply that the U.S. and the USSR confront each other without allies. If the contributions of the NATO and Warsaw Pact nations (other than the U.S. and USSR) were either inconsequential or of roughly equal magnitude, this mode of calculation would

CONTINUED

LUBBOCK AVALANCHE-JOURNAL (TX)
22 June 1983

JAY HARRIS

The CIA Today...



THE SPY BUSINESS has been around as long as there have been people and governments who do not trust one another.

Which has been since the beginning of time.

That "keeping tabs" on one's enemies, if not friends, has been an accepted way of conducting foreign as well as domestic affairs few will dispute. But, how it is done is another matter.

To Col. Vincent M. Lockhart, Ret., and a veteran of more than 50 years service in the National Guard and Army Reserve, along with active duty in three wars, the business of having one of the best intelligence systems in the world is the business of survival.

In fact, the colonel, who spent 19 years with the Central Intelligence Agency, argues such a system is one of the nation's highest priorities.

THAT WAS part of a message the current El Paso soldier-writer left in Lubbock this week in a talk to South Plains Shriners and to us.

Col. Lockhart, a former Texas newsman, is aware that the CIA, along with the FBI and anything else that smacks of "spying" are all high on the target list of the liberal media as well as some politicians and do-gooders.

Yet, he argues that of six major things necessary for this nation's survival, to have "the finest intelligence system in the world" ranks at the top. The CIA is working for America, not against it, he argues in answer to those who accuse the agency of everything from spreading dissension to death.

"As a matter of fact, I will simply tell you that the CIA has never assassinated anyone, and most of the charges against the CIA have not had nor now have any basis in fact," the colonel says when asked about such charges. The CIA has made some mistakes, some biggies, he readily admits, but is not guilty of most of the things of which it is accused, he says.

THOSE AREN'T the only misconceptions about the CIA, Lockhart says.

In the first place, the CIA hasn't been around since the days of Mata Hari. "Few people realize it," Lockhart says, "but the National Defense Act of 1947, which created the joint Chiefs of Staff concept, also created the CIA."

"Everyone says that it was started to prevent another Pearl Harbor, but Pearl Harbor had nothing to do with it," Lockhart says.

The nation was well into World War II when FDR felt he needed some sort of intelligence setup on a worldwide basis which could central-

ize the vast amount of data pouring into Washington. He called on Wild Bill Donovan to set up the Office of Strategic Services, OSS, which played a key role in some phases of WWII.

After the war, the Central Intelligence Group was formed by Executive Order, more as a caretaker for records of the OSS than anything else. But, then President Truman accepted advice to expand the agency's role and pushed the CIA as part of the defense legislation, Lockhart says. HST persuaded Allen Dulles, who had worked with the OSS, to get the whole thing underway. It was in the early stages of the CIA in the 1950's that Col. Lockhart, after a stint as publisher of The Canadian Record, and study at the Staff and Command School, became involved with the agency in a top-level position.

LOCKHART SAYS the CIA has been blamed for, and given credit for many things it should not have been.

Among its early "notable successes," he cites as 1953 when the CIA "stiffened the backbone of the Iranian Army and helped the Shah of Iran regain his throne against Mossadegh." The other had to do with aiding in the defeat of the Communist regime which sought to take-over Guatemala in 1954.

But, despite the fact that the CIA was doing a good, solid job at home and abroad in taking information and making it into solid intelligence, the organization soon got in over its head and capabilities, Lockhart admits.

"The Bay of Pigs was the first great disaster for the agency," Lockhart says. It failed, he says, because 1. Such an operation was beyond the capability of the CIA, 2. Political reasons caused a change in plans, and 3. JFK withdrew critical U.S. air support at the last minute.

The Vietnam War "was another dagger in the side of CIA," Lockhart says. Again the agency was called on to do things past its capability, "and when the unpopular war ended, the anti-war groups turned their vindictive criticism against both the CIA and the FBI."

WATERGATE, WITH the involvement of a former CIA agent, and the baying of the liberal media only added to the CIA's problems.

In the wake of what Lockhart calls a "witch hunt" by Congress, "grossly exaggerated charges were made in the media." Those charges included the claims "that the CIA was guilty of massive domestic spying; had assassinated foreign leaders, and possibly even President Kennedy." The CIA has even been "linked" to the death of Marilyn Monroe.

But, Lockhart says that "the most damaging assaults on the CIA have been by a handful of former employees, mostly in the name of the peoples' right to know." And while he thinks the government must answer to the people, Lockhart argues "no intelligence system can operate in full view of the world. The KGB doesn't!"

Lockhart says that Adm. Stansfield Turner did more to "emasculate" the CIA as its director under President Carter than anyone before or since. But, under William Casey, he says things are looking up.

"I believe the CIA will return as a top-flight organization," he says, "But I am just as sure it will never return to the glorious days of the late fifties and early sixties. Perhaps it is just as well..."

Censorship forever too extreme a remedy

Admiral Stansfield Turner has written a book about his experiences as head of the Central Intelligence Agency.

You'll never read it exactly as he wrote it. It'll be shorter — maybe a lot shorter — by the time the public gets to read it.

The reason is that Turner signed an agreement when he joined the CIA giving the agency the power to censor anything he might write, ever, about his CIA-related duties.

There's no reason to think that Turner, presumably as patriotic an American as anyone else, would reveal anything that might damage national security. And being the ex-boss of the CIA, he should know as well as anyone which intelligence secrets should remain secret.

That doesn't matter. Under the rules, Turner's book is being censored. News reports say deletions are being made, and Turner is finding out what it's like to have one's right of free speech restricted.

For years, only CIA agents and a few high officials in unusually sensitive positions were required to sign pledges to submit future writings (or texts of speeches) to such review. The courts have held that the pledges are binding on these people.

A FEW MONTHS ago, however, President Reagan imposed the same conditions of prior restraint on an estimated 100,000 more federal personnel.

By means of executive order No. 12356, Reagan has required all persons with access to classified information to submit for review and censorship anything they might want to write or say about their official experiences.

Covered by the order are White House staff members, cabinet members, many State Department and Defense Department officials and the National Security Council and its staff.

These people would not be bound by the executive order only until they left government service, or for one year, or five years or 10 years thereafter. For the rest of their lives, anything they'd like to write about their Washington experiences would have to be reviewed.

The stated purpose of the order is to prevent illegal disclosure of classified information. But many political observers suspect it's aimed as much at stopping "leaks" that are politically embarrassing as it is at keeping sensitive material out of unfriendly hands.

The executive order also requires covered personnel to take lie detector tests whenever they're asked to in the course of investigations into leaks.

So far, the courts haven't allowed refusals to take lie detector tests to be used against federal employees. Even so, a refusal is likely to be seen by higher-ups as evidence of guilt, and the employee who refuses a test for whatever reason is likely to see his career come to a screeching halt.

THERE ARE better ways to reduce leaks of damaging information than imposing lifetime censorship on 100,000 more federal employees.

First, only information whose disclosure would truly damage national security should be classified. Some Washington columnists routinely reveal information that appears to have been classified primarily because its disclosure would embarrass an administration, or an agency, or even an individual. Stamping such documents "secret" makes the public skeptical about the entire classification process and probably makes some employees less reluctant to leak information. Appropriate steps could then be taken against those who reveal genuinely damaging secrets.

Second, high-ranking officials should stop the practice of leaking classified information themselves, which is believed to be a common way of manipulating public opinion. According to Sen. Patrick Moynihan of New York,

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE B-1

WASHINGTON POST
12 June 1983

This President Wants Silence By Censorship

Reagan's new rule could gag officials for life

By Frank Snepp

WHEN THE SUPREME Court ruled against me in 1980 and upheld the enforceability of government secrecy agreements, my father — who is a conservative superior court judge — predicted that "one of these days some patriot in the White House will realize the power the Brethren have given him," and saddle us with a system of censorship such as we've never seen in this country.

My father has been proven right. President Reagan, citing *Snepp v. U.S.*, has decreed that every bureaucrat "with authorized access to classified information shall be required to sign a nondisclosure agreement."

This order will obligate some bureaucrats to submit all work-related writings for government censorship for the rest of their lives. And the Supreme Court made clear in my case that these government workers won't even have to sign secrecy agreement to become censorship candidates. All they have to do is get assigned to an official "position of trust" with "conceded access to confidential sources and materials." From that point on, they're implicitly obligated not to publish anything, classified or not, about their work, without official approval. Forever.

In a "fact sheet" attached to the Reagan order, the Justice Department reminds all bureaucrats of this implicit "fiduciary duty." This clears the way for a censorship system that is virtually open-ended.

Steven Garfinkel, the official responsible for monitoring governmentwide security programs, has conceded to Congress that though he can't say for sure how many bureaucrats traffic in classified information, at least 65 official departments and agencies do. The mind boggles at the potential number of gag victims this estimate implies. The 11 agencies that make up the U.S. intelligence community, by themselves, are 200,000-strong.

In practical terms, if the Reagan order is enforced, many of the turnstile bureaucrats who come and go with each administration will be out of business.

Will the
look favorably
former re
partment
the State
Would
at George
brace such
patrick of
Would

Heritage Foundation who've served the Reagan White House be happy about being censored by the liberal constituents of a Mondale, Glenn or Cranston administration?

You don't need a definitive answers to these questions to view the Reagan order as ill-conceived and dangerous.

Predictably, the administration has had a problem selling its scheme. Deputy Assistant Attorney General Richard Willard, principal author of the Reagan directive, initially claimed that the secrecy agreements were needed to stem a flood tide of leaks which "has increased in severity over the past decade." But then Garfinkel, the government's designated auditor of leaks, conceded to a congressional subcommittee that only a half-dozen leaks had been reported to his office in the past three years.

Willard tried to recoup. In a TV interview, he said it wasn't the quantity or severity of leaks that necessitated the gag rule. Rather, it was the worries of our allies — their "lack of confidence in our government's ability to keep secret important information."

Since most of our allies (witness the British) have far more stringent secrecy regulations than we do — and far more serious security problems — Willard's attempt to justify the Reagan directive is a token of how desperate his case has become. And no wonder. Numerous authoritative voices have been raised against its assumptions.

Writing in *Foreign Policy* last fall, former CIA Director Stansfield Turner declared: "Fortunately, while several leaks about actual espionage in the past six or seven years have involved serious breaches of security, very little information harmful to U.S. intelligence interests has been revealed. In short, the impression that intelligence agencies cannot keep secrets is highly exaggerated."

Former Deputy CIA Director Bobby Inman has also cast doubt on the wisdom of the administration crackdown. Last winter he told *U.S. News & World Report* that the

CONTINUED